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“POLITICS!”? OF COURSE!
A REFLECTION ON WASHINGTON V. TRUMP
Paul Babie ∗
ABSTRACT
Were the decisions in Washington v. Trump political? Of course they
were! While some may not care to admit it, President Trump correctly
identifies—albeit for the wrong reasons—the political nature of the decisions.
Rather than rendering them illegitimate, as the President suggested, the
political nature of the District Court and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
decisions is the very essence of their legitimacy and validity. This Essay
explains why.
We all know now, though the thought was once generally
considered a heresy, that courts legislate in the process of
developing the common law. 1

I.

WASHINGTON V. TRUMP

On January 27, 2017, acting pursuant to section 212(f) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952 and 3 U.S.C. § 301, President Donald Trump
signed Executive Order 13769 (EO 13769), entitled “Protecting the Nation
from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.” 2 Among other things, EO
13769 suspended the United States Refugee Admissions Program for 120 days,
restricted admission of citizens from seven Muslim-majority countries for
ninety days, ordered a list of countries for entry restrictions after the initial
ninety days, suspended admission of Syrian refugees indefinitely, and
prioritized refugee claims by individuals from minority religions on the basis
of religious-based persecution. 3 The initial effect of EO 13769 resulted in the
detention of people who were previously approved to travel to the United

∗

Adelaide Law School, The University of Adelaide.
Robert L. Hale, Commissions, Rates, and Policies, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1103, 1143 (1940).
2
Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017). The order was promulgated pursuant to
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 212(e) (2012).
3
Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977, 8,978–80 (Jan. 27, 2017).
1
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States either at their departure airports or at airports upon arrival in the United
States. 4
Washington and Minnesota brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, arguing that EO 13769 was unconstitutional
and illegal, and sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent its
implementation pending the litigation on the merits. 5 On February 3rd, U.S.
District Judge Robart granted the nationwide TRO sought by Washington and
Minnesota, 6 and on February 9th, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit (Judges Canby, Clifton, and Friedland) unanimously upheld it. 7
Pursuant to en banc procedure, all members of a Circuit Court of Appeals
may rehear the original decision of a panel selected from that court; 8 the U.S.
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure allow a Circuit Court to establish its own
en banc procedure, which the Ninth Circuit has done. 9 Pursuant to that
procedure, following the issuance of a three-judge panel order or opinion, the
parties are entitled to seek reconsideration before an en banc panel.
Alternatively, another circuit judge may request that a vote be held on whether
a decision should be reheard by an en banc panel, even if the parties have not
requested it. 10 Under this latter procedure, known as a “sua sponte en banc
call,” the circuit judge who made the request is not identified and the parties
are typically requested to provide their thoughts as to whether a case should be
reheard en banc before the full Circuit Court conducts a vote. 11 An order of the

4
Michael D. Shear et al., Judge Blocks Trump Order on Refugees Amid Chaos and Outcry Worldwide,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/28/us/refugees-detained-at-us-airportsprompting-legal-challenges-to-trumps-immigration-order.html.
5
State v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017). Massachusetts, New
York, Virginia and Washington, as well as San Francisco sued the federal government, alleging violations of
the U.S. Constitution’s guarantees of religious freedom. Scott Malone & Dan Levine, Challenges to Trump’s
Immigration Orders Spread to More U.S. States, REUTERS (Jan. 31, 2017, 9:24 AM) http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-trump-immigration-sanfrancisco-idUSKBN15F2B1; see Andrew Liptak, In the Last 24 Hours,
Four Federal Courts Have Objected to Trump’s Actions: Here’s Where We Stand, VERGE (Jan. 29, 2017,
12:33 PM) http://www.theverge.com/2017/1/29/14430082/four-federal-courts-ruled-trump-immigration-ban.
6
Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, slip op. at 2–3.
7
Washington v. Trump, 853 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2017), amended and superseded by 858 F.3d 1168 (9th
Cir. 2017).
8
28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2012).
9
FED. R. APP. P. 35 (providing rule for en banc determination); see also 9TH CIR. R. 35-1 (providing
rule for petition for rehearing en banc); U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, General Orders ch. 5
(providing general orders regarding en banc procedures).
10
Media Advisory, U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit, Ninth Circuit En Banc Procedure Summary (Feb.
10, 2017).
11
Id.
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Chief Judge or En Banc Coordinator makes the briefing request. 12 Upon
receipt of the briefs filed by the parties, a vote is held. 13 To succeed, such a
vote must attract a majority of the twenty-nine active, non-recused judges of
the Ninth Circuit to proceed to en banc reconsideration, which would include
the Chief Judge and ten non-recused, randomly drawn judges. 14
In the Washington v. Trump litigation, a Ninth Circuit judge made such a
request, whereupon Chief Judge Sidney Thomas issued an order directing the
parties to file briefs by February 16th. 15 The motion failed, however, to attract
a majority of votes, 16 and due to the revocation and replacement of EO 13769
(see infra), on March 9th the United States moved voluntarily to dismiss its
appeal in the matter. 17 Nonetheless, on March 17th, Circuit Judges Reinhardt
and Berzon wrote opinions concurring with the denial of en banc
reconsideration, and Circuit Judges Kozinski, Bybee, and Bea wrote dissents. 18
In so doing, those judges expressed views concerning the positions taken in the
published opinion of Judges Canby, Clifton, and Friedland. 19
While the en banc vote and voluntary dismissal in Washington v. Trump
was working its way through the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, on March
6th, President Trump revoked EO 13769 and replaced it with Executive Order
13780 (EO 13780). 20 Like its predecessor, EO 13780 restricted admission to
and halted new visa applications of citizens from six of the seven countries
covered by EO 13769 for ninety days, ordered a list of countries for entry
restrictions after the initial ninety days, and suspended admission of refugees
for 120 days who do not possess either a visa or valid travel documents. 21 EO
13780 contained no mention of prioritized refugee claims by individuals from
minority religions on the basis of religious-based persecution. 22

Id.
Id.
14
Id. For en banc procedures and the empirical likelihood of en banc review, see JENNIFER BARNES
BOWIE ET AL., THE VIEW FROM THE BENCH AND CHAMBERS: EXAMINING JUDICIAL PROCESS AND DECISION
MAKING ON THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 203–27 (2014).
15
Media Advisory, U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit, supra note 10.
16
Washington v. Trump, 853 F.3d 933, 935 (9th Cir. 2017).
17
Appellants’ Motion for Voluntary Dismissal, 853 F.3d 933 (2017) (No. 17-35015).
18
Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017).
19
See id.
20
Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017). The order was promulgated pursuant to
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 212(e) (2012).
21
Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017). Iraq was left off the revised list. Id.
22
Id.
12
13
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Immediately upon its promulgation, the State of Hawaii and the
International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP) brought suits against the
United States in the U.S. District Court for the Districts of Hawaii and
Maryland, respectively, claiming that EO 13780 was illegal and
unconstitutional for the same reasons as those relied upon in the litigation
involving EO 13769. 23 On March 15, the district court judges in both cases
issued nationwide TROs with respect to parts of EO 13780, pending full
review on the merits. 24 In doing so, District Judge Derrick Watson of Hawaii
held that statements made by the President beyond the scope of EO 13780
indicated that it was likely motivated by anti-Muslim sentiment, in violation of
the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 25 District Judge Theodore
Chuang in Maryland issued a TRO for the same reasons. 26 On March 17, the
United States filed a notice of appeal of District Judge Chuang’s Order in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 27 On March 29, Judge Watson
issued an order converting the TRO granted in Honolulu on March 15 to a
Preliminary Injunction. 28 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld District
Judge Chuang’s order, finding that the travel ban imposed by EO 13780 “drips
with religious intolerance, animus and discrimination.” 29 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals soon followed the Fourth, upholding the injunction issued by
District Judge Watson. 30 On June 26, the Supreme Court granted the United
States’ petitions for certiorari and consolidated the IRAP and Hawaii cases for
oral argument, scheduled for the October Term 2017. 31

23
Richard Gonzales et al., Trump Travel Ban Blocked Nationwide by Federal Judges in Hawaii,
Maryland, NPR (Mar. 15, 2017, 8:01 AM), www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/03/15/520171478/trumptravel-ban-faces-court-hearings-by-challengers-today.
24
Id.
25
State v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (D. Haw. 2017).
26
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md. 2017).
27
Notice of Appeal, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md. 2017)
(No. 8:17-CV-00361-TDC).
28
Order Granting Motion to Convert Temporary Restraining Order to a Preliminary Injunction, State v.
Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (D. Haw. 2017) (No. 17-00050 DKW-KSC).
29
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 572 (4th Cir. 2017), vacated as moot, No.
16-1436, 2017 WL 4518553 (Oct. 10, 2017); S.M., Dripping with a Court’s Contempt: An Appeals Court
Deals Another Blow to Donald Trump’s Travel Ban, ECONOMIST (May 26, 2017), http://www.economist.com/
blogs/democracyinamerica/2017/05/dripping-court-s-contempt?cid1=cust/ddnew/n/n/n/20170526n/owned/n/n/
nwl/n/n/ap/Daily_Dispatch/email&etear=dailydispatch.
30
Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted sub nom. Trump v. Int’l Refugee
Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017).
31
Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2086 (2017) (per curiam). The Court also
granted the Government’s stay applications with respect to the preliminary injunctions, narrowing the scope of
the injunctions as to § 2(c) and § 6(a)–(b) of EO 13780, so as not to enforce those provisions against “foreign
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On September 24, however, President Trump issued a revised version of
the travel ban in Proclamation No. 9645 (EO-3), 32 couched in terms similar to
those found in the earlier two EOs, adding Chad, North Korea, and Venezuela,
and removing Sudan from the list of countries for restricted admission. As a
consequence of EO-3, the Supreme Court, which had scheduled the oral
argument in the IRAP and Hawaii appeals for October 10, having sought
written submissions from the parties, dismissed as moot and vacated the Fourth
Circuit opinion in IRAP. 33 The Supreme Court is expected to do the same in
the Hawaii appeal. Notwithstanding the mootness of those appeals,
commentators expect the constitutionality of EO-3 ultimately to reach the
Supreme Court, possibly as early as this year. Indeed, the process that will lead
the EO-3 travel ban back to the Supreme Court began on October 17, when
District Judge Watson in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii
issued a TRO of EO-3. 34
The complex litigation surrounding the three iterations of a travel ban
promulgated by President Trump provides a fascinating account of the
interplay between executive power and immigration. This Essay, however,
focuses on President Trump’s comments as they relate to Washington v.
Trump, the work of District Judge Robart and Circuit Judges in the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals—both in the original opinion of Judges Canby,
Clifton, and Friedland and in the en banc opinions of Judges Reinhardt,
nationals who have a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States;” all
other foreign nationals were left subject to the provisions of EO 13780. Id. at 2088. On June 29, Hawaii filed a
Memorandum in Support of Emergency Motion to Clarify Scope of Preliminary Injunction. State v. Trump,
No. 1:17-CV-00050-DKW-KSC (June 29, 2017) (seeking a clarification of the District Court’s injunction in
response to the Trump Administration’s statements about its plans to implement the Executive Order in its
entirety). The District Court of Hawaii denied the request on July 6. State v. Trump, No. 1:17-CV-00050DKW-KSC, 2017 WL 2882696 (D. Haw. July 6, 2017) (having modified the preliminary injunction on June
19). The Ninth Circuit, in an order filed on July 7, dismissed the Government’s emergency appeal of the
District Court’s July 6th order denying the request for clarification. Hawaii v. Trump, 863 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir.
2017). On July 19, the Supreme Court denied the Government’s motion seeking clarification of its order of
June 26, and stayed the District Court’s March 29th order modifying the preliminary injunction with respect to
refugees covered by a formal assurance pending resolution by the Ninth Circuit. Trump v. Hawaii, No. 161540 (16A1191), 2017 WL 3045234 (July 19, 2017). In an opinion filed on September 7, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the enforceable scope of the EO 13780, as found in the District Court’s March 29th order (as
modified on June 19), and staying implementation of the EO with respect to both family members and
refugees. Hawaii v. Trump, 871 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2017). On September 11th, the Supreme Court granted a
partial stay of this second Ninth Circuit mandate with respect to refugees covered by a formal assurance of an
agent. Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17A275, 2017 WL 3975174 (Sept. 11, 2017).
32
Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017).
33
Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Program, No. 16-1436, 2017 WL 4518553 (Oct. 10, 2017).
34
Hawaii v. Trump, No. 17-00050 DKW-KSC (Oct. 17, 2017).
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Berzon, Kozinski, Bybee, and Bea. In a series of tweets, President Trump
shared his thoughts about the work of these judges as the case progressed
through the District and Ninth Circuit Courts. 35 The day after the District Court
granted the TRO, February 4, President Trump tweeted five times:
The opinion of this so-called judge, which essentially takes lawenforcement away from our country, is ridiculous and will be
overturned! 36
What is our country coming to when a judge can halt a Homeland
Security travel ban and anyone, even with bad intentions, can come
into U.S.? 37
Because the ban was lifted by a judge, many very bad and
dangerous people may be pouring into our country. A terrible
decision[.] 38
Why aren’t the lawyers looking at and using the Federal Court
decision in Boston, which is at conflict with ridiculous lift ban
decision? 39

35
Interestingly, President Trump failed to tweet in relation to the TROs issued by Judges Watson and
Chuang, choosing instead to speak publicly in Nashville, Tennessee on March 15, saying that Judge Watson’s
TRO was “an unprecedented judicial overreach,” threatening to appeal ultimately to the U.S. Supreme Court if
necessary, in the interest of national security. Gene Johnson et al., Trump’s Muslim Rhetoric Key Issue in
Travel Ban Rulings, PBS NEWSHOUR (Mar. 17, 2017, 4:46 PM) http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/
trumps-muslim-rhetoric-key-issue-travel-ban-rulings/.
36
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 5:12 AM), https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/827867311054974976?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw&ref_url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mccla
tchydc.com%2Fnews%2Fpolitics-government%2Fwhite-house%2Farticle130780834.html.
37
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 12:44 PM), https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/827981079042805761?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw&ref_url=http%3A%2F%2Fwhatdidtru
mpdotoday.com%2Fdonald-trump-february-4-2017%2F.
38
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 1:44 PM), https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/827996357252243456?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw&ref_url=http%3A%2F%2Fwhatdidtru
mpdotoday.com%2Fdonald-trump-february-4-2017%2F.
39
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 3:37 PM), https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/828024835670413312?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw&ref_url=http%3A%2F%2Fwhatdidtru
mpdotoday.com%2Fdonald-trump-february-4-2017%2F.
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The judge opens up our country to potential terrorists and others
that do not have our best interests at heart. Bad people are very
happy! 40

And twice on February 5:
Just cannot believe a judge would put our country in such peril. If
something happens blame him and court system. People pouring in.
Bad! 41
I have instructed Homeland Security to check people coming into
our country VERY CAREFULLY. The courts are making the job
very difficult! 42

On February 8, prior to the release of Ninth Circuit’s judgment upholding the
TRO:
If the U.S. does not win this case as it so obviously should, we can
never have the security and safety to which we are entitled.
Politics! 43

Immediately after the unanimous judgment of the Ninth Circuit upholding the
TRO on February 9, President Trump tweeted:
SEE YOU IN COURT, THE SECURITY OF OUR NATION IS
AT STAKE! 44

40
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 4:48 PM), https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/828042506851934209?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw&ref_url=http%3A%2F%2Fwhatdidtru
mpdotoday.com%2Fdonald-trump-february-4-2017%2F.
41
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 5, 2017, 12:39 PM), https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/828342202174668800?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw&ref_url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.miam
iherald.com%2Fnews%2Fpolitics-government%2Farticle130919284.html.
42
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 5, 2017, 12:42 PM), https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/828343072840900610?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw&ref_url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.miam
iherald.com%2Fnews%2Fpolitics-government%2Farticle130919284.html.
43
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 8, 2017, 4:03 AM), https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/829299566344359936?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw&ref_url=http%3A%2F%2Fdonald.tru
mptwitter.online%2F2017%2F02%2Fwednesday-february-8-2017.html.
44
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 9, 2017, 3:35 PM), https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/829836231802515457?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw&ref_url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.charl
otteobserver.com%2Fnews%2Fpolitics-government%2Farticle131638449.html.
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President Trump’s tweets clearly sought to criticize the four federal judges
involved in the District Court and the original opinion of the Ninth Circuit. The
tweet of February 8 concludes with a single exclamatory word: “Politics!”
President Trump delivered a speech a few hours after the February 8th tweet,
in which “he called the hearing ‘disgraceful,’ complained that the courts are
‘so political’ and said that ‘if these judges wanted to, in [his] opinion, help the
court in terms of respect for the court, they’d do what they should be doing.’” 45
Taken together, the February 8th tweet and speech implied that these four
judges were acting in a politically motivated way. In President Trump’s view,
these judges were acting in opposition to “the law;” in this case the protection
of national security through the promulgation of an Executive Order pursuant
to the Presidential power to so act conferred by Congress in the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952. 46 Additionally, the February 8th tweet further
implied that the judges would be acting extra-legally and illegitimately,
particularly if the Ninth Circuit upheld the TRO. When considered within the
context of the entirety of the tweets and their criticism of the judges involved,
it appears as through the President intended to use “Politics!” in an equally
critical way, implying that because the judges were somehow acting
politically, they were also acting illegitimately, rendering their opinions invalid
for that reason.
People who opposed EO 13769, commenting on the Trump litigation,
seemed aghast that the President would refer to the courts as political entities,
their actions motivated by, as President Trump put it, “Politics!” People who
took that position argued that the courts were acting entirely legitimately,
according to the principles of justice and the rule of law, as one would expect
in a nation governed by laws and not by people. 47 Those who supported EO
13769, however, were equally dismayed, arguing that the courts were clearly
acting politically and that they ought to be guided by the rule of law—by
which it is presumably intended that the United States is a government of law,
not of people. 48
45
Editorial Board, Opinion, After Mr. Trump’s Din, the Quiet Grandeur of the Courts, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/opinion/after-mr-trumps-din-the-quiet-grandeur-of-thecourts.html.
46
Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (preamble).
47
See, e.g., Editorial Board, supra note 42; Melissa Coade, Former Chief Justice Takes on Trump and
the Rule of Law, LAW. WKLY. (Feb. 14, 2017), http://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/news/20533-former-chiefjustice-takes-on-trump-and-the-rule-of-law?utm_source=LawyersWeekly&utm_campaign=14_02_17&utm_
medium=email&utm_content=1.
48
See Mathew Ingram, How Trump’s Tweets Helped Convince the Appeals Court to Reject His Travel
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So, the question arises: Were the decisions in Trump political? Of course
they were! While people of all political stripes may not care to admit it,
President Trump was right about the political nature of the decisions. He was
right, but for the wrong reasons. The political nature of these decisions, far
from rendering them illegitimate and invalid, is the very essence of their
legitimacy and validity. This Essay explains why. Part I set the scene by
providing the background to the travel bans and the surrounding litigation. Part
II theorizes the political nature of the work of courts. Part III considers how the
opinions of the District Court and the Ninth Circuit—both the original panel
and those of the judges who wrote as part of the en banc process—in
Washington v. Trump demonstrate the political nature of a court’s work. Part
IV concludes that the decisions are legitimate because they are political.
Indeed, that is true of any such decision, including those given and those to
come, as part of the litigation surrounding the travel ban.
II.

ARE COURTS POLITICAL? OF COURSE THEY ARE!

There is ample evidence supporting the fact that what judges, especially
American judges, do is political. The Brethren, written in 1979, offers an at
once fascinating and astounding account of the inner workings of the U.S.
Supreme Court. 49 It reveals that judgments depend on the same horse-trading
and deal-making that one expects to find as part of the politicking that goes on
every day in any legislature. 50 Again and again, the account highlights the
importance of “counting votes” during the conferences at which justices decide
who will write opinions in the cases before the Court, as if all that mattered
was a form of democratic majoritarianism rather than the objectivity of justice
and the rule of law. 51
But perhaps such internal judicial democracy is happening. Justice William
Brennan once referred to this vote counting as the “rule of five”:
At some point early in their clerkships, Brennan asked his clerks to
name the most important rule in constitutional law. Typically they
fumbled, offering Marbury v. Madison or Brown v. Board of
Education as their answers. Brennan would reject each answer, in

Ban, FORTUNE (Feb. 10, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/02/10/donald-trump-appeals-court-tweets-travel-ban/.
49
See generally BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
(1979).
50
Id.
51
Id.
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the end providing his own by holding up his hand with the fingers
wide apart. This, he would say, is the most important rule in
constitutional law. Some clerks understood Brennan to mean that it
takes five votes to do anything, others that with five votes you could
do anything. 52

That doesn’t sound very much like an impartial and apolitical judge in a
court made up of similarly independent jurists working from objective
principles like justice, the rule of law, and government of law, not of people. It
rather sounds a lot like a pork-barrelling, horse-trading, deal-making
politician—as the justices themselves admit in The Brethren—“counting the
votes” needed to get the deal done. 53
The American legal realists theorized this point in the 1920s and 1930s, 54
critiquing the Supreme Court, and its rejection of President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation of the 1930s, on seemingly constitutional
protection of the right to freedom of contract as enunciated in Lochner v. New
York. 55 President Roosevelt threatened to “pack the Court”—with an additional
Justice, up to a maximum of six, for every member of the court over the age of
seventy years and six months 56—if it continued to strike down his legislation.
The famous “switch in time that saved nine” occurred when Justice Owen
Roberts of the U.S. Supreme Court, in the 1937 case West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 57 upheld the impugned law on seemingly the same constitutional
grounds. The switch itself is today seen as a strategic (read political) move
designed to save the nine-member Court. 58 This prompted the legal realists to
argue that law was political, as demonstrated by Roberts’s changed vote that
saved the nine-member Supreme Court. 59

Mark Tushnet, Themes in Warren Court Biographies, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 748, 763 (1995).
See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 49. See generally TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE
OF A POLITICAL COURT (1999).
54
See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
55
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
56
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN
THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 124 (1995) (summarizing the Judicial Procedures Reform Bill of 1937). See generally
MARIAN C. MCKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL WAR: THE COURT-PACKING
CRISIS OF 1937 (1st ed. 2002).
57
W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
58
A Stitch in Time Saves Nine, GEORGE MASON U., http://mason.gmu.edu/~dcurrie/English_344/Photo_
Remix.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2017).
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Supreme Shifts, WILSON Q., Winter 2006, at 68, 68–69.
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In American legal realism one finds the intellectual origins of the critical
legal studies (CLS) movement, which developed and sharpened the critique of
law as a determinate body of rules. 60 A project aimed at revealing the hidden
interests and class domination of law found in liberal legal institutions, “[a]t its
most basic level, the CLS movement challenges society to consider some
ultimate questions about the validity of its own institutions and to reconsider
some past ‘ultimate answers’ upon which those institutions are based.” 61 In
short, the law was revealed to be part of the liberal (and today, neo-liberal)
project designed to support and perpetuate those institutions of economic
power that control society.
American legal realists and CLS scholars demonstrate that while we might
speak of the determinacy of law—talk which can be summarized in phrases
like “justice,” “precedent,” “rule of law,” or “government of law, not
people”—this is nothing more than an idealized portrait of law and what
judges do that seems anchored in those phrases. 62 In fact, they are not so
anchored; rather, they are entirely unanchored, indeterminate, and designed to
support and reproduce power of all sorts in a society. This is what David
Kairys calls the “idealized decision-making process:”
The separation of law from politics is supposedly accomplished and
ensured by a number of perceived attributes of the legal decisionmaking process, including judicial subservience to the Constitution,
statutes, and precedent; the quasi-scientific, objective nature of
legal analysis; and the technical expertise of judges and lawyers.
Together, these attributes constitute an idealized decision-making
process in which (1) the law on a particular issue is preexisting,
predictable, and available to anyone with reasonable legal skill; (2)
the facts relevant to disposition of a case are ascertained by
objective hearing and evidentiary rules that reasonably ensure that
the truth will emerge; (3) the result in a particular case is
determined by a rather routine application of the law to the facts;

60
See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: {FIN DE SIÈCLE} (1998); ROBERTO
MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 1–4 (Harvard Univ. Press 1986).
61
Jonathan Turley, The Hitchhiker’s Guide to CLS, Unger, and Deep Thought, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 593,
594 (1987).
62
DAVID KAIRYS, THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 1, 5–6 (3d ed. 1998). The first
scholar expressly to challenge concepts such as “liberty” and “freedom” was Robert Hale. See Robert L. Hale,
Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 470 (1923).
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and (4) except for the occasional bad judge, any reasonably
competent and fair judge will reach the “correct” decision. 63

The truth, then, is this: to perpetuate the structures of power created and
supported by the liberal project, judges do nothing like what this idealized
portrait of the judicial process suggests. Rather:
The lack of required, legally correct rules, methodologies, or results
is in part a function of the limits of language and interpretation,
which are subjective and value laden. More importantly,
indeterminacy stems from the reality that the law usually embraces
and legitimizes many or all of the conflicting values and interests
involved in controversial issues and a wide and conflicting array of
“logical” or “reasoned” arguments and strategies of argumentation,
without providing any legally required hierarchy of values or
arguments or any required method for determining which is most
important in a particular context. Judges then make choices, and
those choices are most fundamentally value based, or political. 64

Do judges do this without even realizing it, through some sort of “false
consciousness” into which judges are indoctrinated through learning the
process of “legal reasoning”? Maybe. 65 But some argue that rather than
working in good faith—with judges thinking that they really are dispensing
justice according to the rule of law and a government of law and not of
people—judges are in fact in denial of their true role, making law, and are
therefore always acting in bad faith. 66 One of the earliest legal realists,
Benjamin Cardozo, who later served on the Supreme Court, went one step
further, writing simply that “[t]he law which is the resulting product [of the
judge’s work] is not found, but made. The process, being legislative, demands
the legislator’s wisdom.” 67 We can conclude, then, that any judge who denies
that they make law is clearly in bad faith. The judge, being a legislator, makes
law using the same political tools as any elected legislator.

KAIRYS, supra note 62, at 2.
KAIRYS, supra note 62, at 4.
65
See generally LOUIS ALTHUSSER, ON THE REPRODUCTION OF CAPITALISM: IDEOLOGY
IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES (G.M. Goshgarian trans., Verso 2014) (1995).
66
KENNEDY, supra note 60, at 19–20, 56, 194–200.
67
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 115 (13th prtg. 1946).
63
64
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Done in bad faith or not, all of this is simply the reality of the judicial
process. Indeed, it forms an inherent part of a process involving conclusions
deduced from entirely indeterminate rules of law, 68 used instrumentally to take
into account considerations of fairness and public policy, 69 all of which is
entirely divorced from morality. 70 But we need to be clear: this is not
illegitimate, improper, or unjust. Instead, judges are right to operate in this
way, for in so doing, they reinforce democracy by ensuring equality of
participation in the political process. 71 In short, there is a “compatibility of
judicial review with the very principles of democracy.” 72 The work of judges is
inherently political for it ensures the workings of a democracy, especially one
like the United States, which separates that power among three equal branches.
All of this is true whether the court is reaching a decision that appeals to
the left or to the right. The work of judges is always political, which is why
there is so much disagreement about the outcomes. There is simply no
objectively right and objectively wrong answer. Rather, the answers depend
entirely on indeterminate rules instrumentally applied without any anchor in
objective norms of morality, such as justice or freedom. And so, reasonable
people will disagree, which is what we expect from a robust political debate.
III. POLITICS IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
A.

Judges Canby, Clifton, and Friedland

Consider, then, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ treatment of the
reviewability of the President’s power to promulgate an Executive Order on
national security grounds in Washington v. Trump. 73 Before the court, the U.S.
Government argued that:
[T]he district court lacked authority to enjoin enforcement of the
Executive Order because the President has “unreviewable authority
to suspend the admission of any class of aliens.” The Government
KAIRYS, supra note 62, at 5–6.
Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 53 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005).
70
GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, 642–44
(1973).
71
See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 105–79 (1981).
72
SANDRINE BAUME, HANS KELSEN AND THE CASE FOR DEMOCRACY, 53 (John Zvesper trans., ECPR
Press 2011).
73
Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017).
68
69
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d[id] not merely argue that courts owe substantial deference to the
immigration and national security policy determinations of the
political branches—an uncontroversial principle that is wellgrounded in our jurisprudence. . . . Instead, the Government [took]
the position that the President’s decisions about immigration policy,
particularly when motivated by national security concerns, are
unreviewable, even if those actions potentially contravene
constitutional rights and protections. The Government indeed
assert[ed] that it violates separation of powers for the judiciary to
entertain a constitutional challenge to executive actions such as this
one. 74

Not surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, finding that
there was no authority to support such unreviewability, a proposition that
would run counter to the American constitutional democracy. 75 Instead, the
Court found it is a fundamental principle of the U.S. system that the judiciary’s
role is to interpret the law, a duty that sometimes involves the resolution of
challenges to the constitutional authority of another branch of government. 76
The court’s duty to resolve such challenges, the Ninth Circuit held,
extended to considerations of policy behind that promulgation. 77 Thus, while
established jurisprudence might counsel deference to the political branches in
matters of immigration and national security, “the Supreme Court has
repeatedly and explicitly rejected the notion that the political branches have
unreviewable authority over immigration or are not subject to the Constitution
when policymaking in that context.” 78 The Ninth Circuit’s own jurisprudence
“likewise ma[kes] clear that [a]lthough alienage classifications are closely
connected to matters of foreign policy and national security, courts can and do
review foreign policy arguments that are offered to justify legislative or
executive action when constitutional rights are at stake.” 79 And most tellingly,
the court stated expressly that in cases of such exercises of policymaking
authority, “courts can and do review constitutional challenges to the substance
and implementation of immigration policy.” 80 National security offers no
Trump, 853 F.3d at 1161 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
76
Id. at 1161–62.
77
Id. at 1162.
78
Id. (emphasis added).
79
Id. (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting AmericanArab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th Cir. 1995)).
80
Id. at 1163 (emphasis added).
74
75
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reprieve from this conclusion; indeed, courts have reviewed exercises of
authority predicated on this justification even in times of conflict. 81
As such, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the policy decision that
motivated the promulgation of EO 13769 was reviewable pursuant to its duty
to resolve such challenges to the constitutional authority for the President to so
act. 82 The Ninth Circuit made no attempt to cover or veil the assertion that its
role extends to the review of policy decisions. 83 Instead, it framed the nature of
that role in terms that made clear that the judiciary is a fully equal branch of
government along with the two political branches. 84 While it might have
avoided expressly stating that it, too, was a political branch, the very fact of its
review of a policy decision emerging from one of the political branches makes
that fact obvious. 85 The Ninth Circuit was, indeed, acting politically in
concluding that “although courts owe considerable deference to the
President’s policy determinations with respect to immigration and national
security, it is beyond question that the federal judiciary retains the authority to
adjudicate constitutional challenges to executive action.” 86 Deference, yes;
unreviewability of the policy decisions emerging from that process, no.
B.

Judges Reinhardt, Berzon, Kozinski, Bybee, and Bea

The principal opinions in the en banc vote were those dissenting from the
denial of reconsideration filed by Judges Kozinski (with which Judges Bybee,
Callahan, Bea, and Ikuta concurred), Bybee (with which Judges Kozinski,
Callahan, Bea, and Ikuta concurred), and Bea (with which Judges Kozinski,
Callahan, and Ikuta concurred). 87 Two opinions concurring in the denial of en
banc reconsideration were also filed by Judges Reinhardt and Berzon. 88 One
might, of course, begin by saying that the very act of filing vigorous opinions
either concurring or dissenting from the vote to allow en banc reconsideration
is itself a political act. Generally, nothing really needs to be said by the judges
participating in such a vote, and specifically in Washington v. Trump. This was
especially so given that the United States had already withdrawn its appeal by
the time the en banc opinions were filed.
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id.
Id. at 1164.
Id.
Id. at 1163.
Id. at 1163–64.
Id. at 1164 (emphasis added).
Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc opinion).
See id.
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From that perspective, one might conclude that the en banc opinions
constitute a form of political posturing by both majority and dissenting judges
concerning the issues raised, signaling to future litigants how the Circuit might
rule should the issue again reach it. Judge Berzon made that point this way:
“There is no appeal currently before us, and so no stay motion pending that
appeal currently before us either. In other words, all the merits commentary in
the dissents filed by a small minority of the judges of this court is entirely out
of place.” 89 Judge Reinhardt added that:
I concur in our court’s decision regarding President Trump’s first
Executive Order—the ban on immigrants and visitors from seven
Muslim countries. I also concur in our court’s determination to
stand by that decision, despite the effort of a small number of our
members to overturn or vacate it. Finally, I am proud to be a part of
this court and a judicial system that is independent and courageous,
and that vigorously protects the constitutional rights of all,
regardless of the source of any efforts to weaken or diminish them.
Judge Kozinski’s diatribe, filed today, confirms that a small group
of judges, having failed in their effort to undo this court’s decision
with respect to President Trump’s first Executive Order, now seek
on their own, under the guise of a dissent from the denial of en banc
rehearing of an order of voluntary dismissal, to decide the
constitutionality of a second Executive Order that is not before this
court. That is hardly the way the judiciary functions. Peculiar
indeed! 90

Judge Reinhardt supported the original published opinion of Judges Canby,
Clifton, and Friedland, which, as we have seen, was political. 91 But the
question arises, what was “Judge Kozinski’s diatribe” and what does it say
about “the way the judiciary functions”? 92 In short, it reveals nothing less than
Judge Kozinski engaging in political activity to no less an extent than Judges
Canby, Clifton and Friedland. Taking no issue whatsoever with the
fundamental power of the federal judiciary to review and adjudicate
constitutional challenges to executive action, the dissenters quibbled on the
constitutional merits. In fact, they went so far as to raise merits issues not
89
90
91
92

Id. at 1169 (Berzon, J., concurring).
Id. at 1168 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
See generally id.
Id.
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addressed by the original panel. 93 In fact, Judge Bybee wrote that his dissent
was “not to say that presidential immigration policy concerning the entry of
aliens at the border is immune from judicial review, only that our review is
limited . . . and the panel held that limitation inapplicable” 94 or that judicial
deference in immigration matters “does not mean that we have no power of
judicial review at all, but it does mean that our authority to second guess or to
probe the decisions of those branches is carefully circumscribed.” 95 Judge
Bybee further wrote that:
The [original] panel began its analysis from two important
premises: first, that it is an “uncontroversial principle” that we “owe
substantial deference to the immigration and national security
policy determinations of the political branches,” . . . second, that
courts can review constitutional challenges to executive
actions . . . . I agree with both of these propositions. 96

The difference is one of opinion as to the extent of the review, not whether
review itself was possible, and that in turn meant, as Judge Bybee put it, the
authority to second-guess or probe the decisions of the Executive, whatever set
of standards found in previously decided cases one uses. Second-guessing or
probing the policy decisions of the Executive? Whatever the standards selected
for that exercise, it still sounds rather like politics.
For Judge Kozinski (and Judge Bea in a separate opinion), 97 such secondguessing or probing meant that the two key positions taken by Judges Canby,
Clifton, and Friedland were problematic. First, that the original published
opinion improperly relied on Due Process grounds for finding that EO 13769
would be unconstitutional on the merits, when in fact, “the vast majority of
foreigners covered by the executive order have no Due Process rights.” 98
Second, that the original panel’s reliance on the Establishment Clause, drawing
upon President Trump’s informal and unofficial statements made during the
2016 election campaign to support that ground, was “folly.” 99 Why? Because:

93
94
95
96
97
98
99

Id. at 1169–71 (Berzon, J., concurring).
Id. at 1175 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Id. at 1178.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 1185 (Bea, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1171 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1173.
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Candidates say many things on the campaign trail; they are often
contradictory or inflammatory. No shortage of dark purpose can be
found by sifting through the daily promises of a drowning
candidate, when in truth the poor shlub’s only intention is to get
elected. No Supreme Court case—indeed no case anywhere that I
am aware of—sweeps so widely in probing politicians for
unconstitutional motives. And why stop with the campaign?
Personal histories, public and private, can become a scavenger hunt
for statements that a clever lawyer can characterize as proof of a phobia or an -ism, with the prefix depending on the constitutional
challenge of the day. 100

All right, that may not seem so political, right? Perhaps. Perhaps not. Yet
consider Judge Kozinski’s reason for why this matters:
This path is strewn with danger. It will chill campaign speech,
despite the fact that our most basic free speech principles have their
“fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of
campaigns for political office.” And it will mire us in a swamp of
unworkable litigation. Eager research assistants can discover much
in the archives, and those findings will be dumped on us with no
sense of how to weigh them. Does a Meet the Press interview
cancel out an appearance on Face the Nation? Does a year-old
presidential proclamation equal three recent statements from the
cabinet? What is the appropriate place of an overzealous senior
thesis or a poorly selected yearbook quote? 101

But is it the place of the courts to ensure that candidates either do or do not
say things that they may or may not really mean, or that candidates may or
may not make promises that they can or cannot keep? Judge Kozinski answers
this question and, in so doing, implicates himself in the very political activity
which he no doubt seeks to avoid: “Weighing these imponderables is precisely
the kind of ‘judicial psychoanalysis’ that the Supreme Court has told us to
avoid.” 102 And yet, rather than remain silent on whether candidates may
engage in whatever conduct they so choose on the campaign trail, Judge
Kozinski seeks to ensure that such conduct is not inhibited, thus injecting the

100
101
102

Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
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courts into politics in a way that the original panel of Judges Canby, Clifton,
and Reinhardt seemingly avoided.
Perhaps most tellingly, even in filing a vigorous dissent, taking issue with
the merits, Judge Bybee nonetheless concluded that:
The personal attacks on the distinguished district judge and our
colleagues were out of all bounds of civic and persuasive
discourse—particularly when they came from the parties. It does no
credit to the arguments of the parties to impugn the motives or the
competence of the members of this court; ad hominem attacks are
not a substitute for effective advocacy. Such personal attacks treat
the court as though it were merely a political forum in which
bargaining, compromise, and even intimidation are acceptable
principles. The courts of law must be more than that, or we are not
governed by law at all. 103

Yes, the courts are arbiters of law, but Judge Bybee recognizes, too, that they
are also a political forum. In this latter role, courts can, therefore, second-guess
and probe the policy decisions of the other branches of government, with
greater or lesser degrees of deference, to be sure, but second-guessing and
probing all the same. Echoing Judge Reinhardt, this is all very peculiar indeed!
Or, perhaps President Trump’s conclusion more aptly summarizes what
happened in the Ninth Circuit: Politics!
V. CONCLUDING REFLECTION
Many people find repellent the values for which President Trump stands,
and the policies motivated by those values. For that reason, some attempt to
deny or reject the truth: law is politics, and what judges do—as they have done
at every stage of the Washington v. Trump, IRAP and Hawaii litigations, and as
the Justices of the Supreme Court may be called upon to do in respect of EO3—is political, inherently so. That does not make the outcome any less
legitimate. On the contrary, by second-guessing and probing its policy
decisions, the courts strengthen democracy and the political process by
ensuring that the Executive is held to appropriate constitutional standards; and
by doing that, they act legitimately.

103

Id. at 1185 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
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Some may want to deny the legitimacy of the courts involving themselves
in such second-guessing or probing of policy and political decisions. And that
may be particularly so when one disagrees with the values of a President who
relies upon broad unreviewable power in relation to immigration and national
security, and when the motive for so doing seems punitive and motivated by
animus towards a particular religion. Those same people, however, may be less
inclined to do so when they agree with a President seeking to implement
broadly egalitarian policies related to labor relations or health care, when the
motive seems altruistic and just—whatever those concepts might mean. But
that difference of opinion in no way obviates the fact that both outcomes are
political, inherently so; of course they are.
Those who do not like President Trump’s policy choices do not like to
admit that the judges involved in the Washington v. Trump litigation were
second-guessing and probing policy conclusions reached in the Executive
branch. Yet none of those judges, at any point, ever doubted that they had the
power to do so. Either way, make no mistake, the decisions of those judges are
political, inherently so; and everyone knows it. Therein lies their legitimacy as
part of the constitutional democratic process. However much President Trump
might not like the outcome, and however much we may disagree with him, he
was right about this: the decisions in Washington v. Trump are, in fact,
“Politics!”

